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REAL ESTATE CORPORATIONS: SALE OF ALL REALTY
AUTHORIZED BY GENERAL PURPOSE CLAUSE
Eisen v. Post, 3 N.Y.2d 518, 146 N.E.2d 779 (1957)
Plaintiff was the holder of fifty per cent of the outstanding shares of
a New York "real estate" corporation, whose sole assets were a sub-lease
of a theatre and the chattels therein. These assets were sold by the directors
in furtherance of a plan to distribute the proceeds of the sale to the share-
holders in proportion to their holdings. Plaintiff brought an action to set
aside the sale, -based on section 20 of the New York Stock Corporation
Law which authorizes a corporation to sell, lease or exchange its property
and assets but "if such sale, lease or exchange is not made in the regular
course of business of the corporation and involves all or substantially all
of its property" it "shall not be made without the consent" of either all
of the stockholders "given in writing without a meeting" or two thirds of
the stockholders "at a meeting."
The plaintiff's chief contention was that, although the defendant
corporation was, by its charter, authorized to buy, sell and generally deal
in real estate, this sale could not be considered in the regular course of
business because the corporation had never actually engaged in the busi-
ness of buying and selling real estate and that the term "regular course of
business" must be construed to mean the business in which the corporation
had actually engaged, i.e., the leasing and operation of the theatre.
The New York Court of Appeals in reversing the appellate di-
vision's decision in favor of the plaintiff said:
If in view of the purposes and objects for which the cor-
poration was created the particular sale may be regarded as one
in the normal and regular course of business of the corporation,
section 20 is inapplicable . . . . Stated conversely, if the sale is
such as to render the corporation unable, in whole or in part, to
accomplish the purposes or objects for which it was incor-
porated, section 20 is applicable . .. .
This interpretation of section 20 is not new to the field of corporation
law in New York2 nor is it a new approach generally.' However there was
a split of authority in the appellate division. In Strauss v. Midtown Enter-
prise, Inc.,4 and again in Epstein v. Gosseen," the appellate division held
that a sale or a contract for the sale of all the corporate realty by a corpo-
ration organized for the sale of real estate does not require the consent
of the shareholders because section 20 did not apply to such organizations;
1 Eisen v. Post, 3 N.Y.2d 518, 146 N.E.2d 779 (1957).
2 JACOBS, STOCK CORPORATION LAW 163 (1949).
3 Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 1312 (1950); 14a C.J., Corporations §2416 (1921).
4 60 N.Y.S.2d 601, aff'd, 270 App. Div. 837 (1945).
1235 App. Div. 33, 256 N.Y.S. 49 (1932).
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but In the Matter of Hodes,6 a case with almost the same fact pattern as
the principal case, the opposite conclusion had been reached.
In spite of the language to the effect that section 20 did not apply to
real estate corporations it is clear that the question before this court was
whether this sale constituted a transaction in the regular course of business.
The majority's affirmative answer was based on the conviction that any
operation expressly authorized by the certificate of incorporation would be
in the regular course of business.'
Judge Fuld, in his dissent, stated that section 20 not only applied to
the real estate corporation but:
The "business" of a corporation, its "regular course of business,"
just as that of a partnership or an individual, is the business upon
which it is actually engaged, not the business which it was
originally authorized to carry on.
He further thought it was significant that the statute referred not to what
the corporation's charter empowered it to do, but to its "regular course of
business." Of equal importance, he felt, was the tendency of the share-
holder to invest in a particular corporation on the basis of the business
which the corporation is actually conducting, not the business it may be
authorized to pursue.
These arguments lack merit. Basically, a corporation is a purely arti-
ficial body created -by law. It is authorized to act only in accordance with
the law of its creation and that law is its certificate of incorporation and
the statutes of the domiciliary state. The certificate of a corporation and
its by-laws or regulations fix the rights of the shareholder. Once these
rights are fixed, they cannot -be changed except in the manner prescribed
by statute.8 Under the present theory of corporate organization a person
who becomes a shareholder enters a contractual relationship with the corpo-
ration and his contractual rights are confined to those rights in the certi-
ficate and by-laws9 regardless of what he supposes them to be.
In deciding as it did, the court of appeals followed what seems to be
the most logical line of decisions,"0 for as the court said in Painter Vu.
Brainard-Cedar Realty Co.:"
0 278 App. Div. 803, 104 N.Y.S.2d 206 (1951).
7 Wattley v. National Drug Store Corp., 122 Misc. 533, 204, N.Y.S.
254, aff'd mem., 208 App. Div. 836, 204 N.Y.S. 956 (1924). Accord, Thayer v.
Valley Bank, 35 Ariz. 238, 276 Pac. 526 (1929); Traer v. Lucas Prospecting Co.,
124 Iowa 107, 99 N.W. 290 (1904); State v. Western Irrigating Canal Co., 40
Kan. 96, 19 Pac. 349 (1888); Peters v. Waverly Waterfront Imp. Co., 113 Va.
318, 74 S.E. 168 (1912); Wilson v. Miers, 10 C.B. (N.S.) 348, 142 Eng. Repr.
486 (1861).
8 N.Y. STOCK CORP. §§35-40.
9 BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §18 (Rev.ed. 1946).
10 Supra note 3; Jeppi v. Brockman Holding Co., 34 Cal.2d 11, 206 P.2d
847 (1949); Pollack v. Adwood Corp., 321 Mich. 93, 32 N.W.2d 62 (1948).
1129 Ohio App. 123, 129, 163 N.E. 57, 59 (1928).
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
If the position of the defendant (corporation) is correct, it
could not carry on that business (for which it was formed) by
dealing in the only property it had yet acquired except by concur-
rence of three-fourths of the stockholders. That is to say, while
a mere majority of the directors and a majority of the stock-
holders might dissolve the corporation . . . and compel the sale
of the property, three-fourths of the stockholders were requisite
to the transaction of the very business it was incorporated to per-
form.
Had the dissenting opinion -been adopted a real estate corporation
holding only one piece of property, which it was renting because of an un-
favorable market, would be required to call a meeting of the shareholders
before a sale of the property could be safely consummated.
It may be noted here that the approach taken in respect to real estate
corporations has also been applied in cases involving a corporation organized
for purposes other than dealing in real estate generally, but authorized
in connection with its corporate activities to purchase and sell real estate.12
In these cases as well as the principal case the test used by the courts was:
... not the amount involved, but the nature of the transaction,
whether the sale is in the regular course of business of the corpo-
ration and in furtherance of the express objects of its existance,
or something outside the normal and regular course of busi-
ness.13 (Emphasis added.)
The emphasized phrase above clearly refers to those objects and pur-
poses expressly set out in the certificate of incorporation. In determining
what sales were in the regular course of -business in Wattley v. National
Drug Stores Corp., 4 the court said "we need go no further than
the specified powers contained in the certificate which undoubtedly author-
ize such sale."' 5 Again in Petition of 4vard"8 the court looked to the
certificate of incorporation and, finding that the directors in addition to
operating a knitting mill in New York were authorized to "do all acts and
things as may be necessary, convenient, or incidental to its business,"''17 held
that a sale of the mill in contemplation of a move to another state was in
the regular course of business and not in violation of section 20.
With the all inclusive general purpose clause of the modern corpo-
12 Wattley v. National Drug Store Corporation, supra note 7 (retail drug
business with general authorization to sell its real property); Thayer v. Valley
Bank, supra note 7 (general authorization of bank to deal in real estate) ; Matter
of Miglietta, 287 N.Y. 246, 39 N.E.2d 224 (1942); Matter of Timmis, 200 N.Y.
177, 93 N.E. 522 (1910); Tuttle v. Junior Bldg. Corp., 227 N.C. 146, 41
S.E.2d 365 (1947) (authorized to purchase, develop and sell one particular parcel
of real estate).
13 Matter of Miglietta, supra note 12, at 254.
14 Supra note 7.
15d. at 535.
165 Misc.2d 817, 144 N.Y.S.2d 204- (1955).
17 Id. at 818.
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ration' 8 there are few transactions which are not permitted by directorial
action alone. Herein lies the principal objection to the test laid down by the
court in Eisen v. Post. If literally followed there are few transactions to
which the statute will apply.' 9 In addition there is no guarantee that the
directors will apply the proceeds of the sale to the furtherance of the busi-
ness or remain in business at all after the sale. While it is true that the
shareholders would have to approve a dissolution, it would be too late to
give them the protection contemplated under section 20.
Lloyd D. Phillips
18 As said by Lord Wrenbury in Cotman v. Broughman, [1918] A.C. 514,
523, "IT]he function of the (certificate) is taken to be, not to specify, not to
disclose, but to bury beneath a mass of words the real object or objects of the
company with the intent that every conceivable form of activity shall be found
included somewhere within its terms. . . ."
19 A different result is possible under OHIo REv. CODE §1701.76 (1955), which
provides that a sale must be made in "the usual and regular course" of business
to be exempt from the requirement of shareholder approval.
20N.Y. STocK CORP. §§105-107.
